Opinions

Interpreting North Korea's launch

In print | April 16, 2009

Obama’s sojourn to Europe and the Middle East has given him ample opportunity to play nice. He has apologized for American “arrogance and bigotry” in France, adopted a conciliatory and cooperative tone with the Russians, and quite literally prostrated himself before the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, all to the chagrin (read: sputtering fury) of conservative pundits. But he also got a chance to show his tough side after the North Korean “failed” missile test, and denouncing further Korean weapons development is one area where conservatives and Obama supporters can agree — or so it would seem.

To offer a brief caveat: the language of condemnation can hide some questionable ideological suppositions, from both sides of the political spectrum. And the danger’s in the details.
Readers may notice that I placed the word “failed” in quotations in the opening paragraph. Indeed, there remains little doubt that the Taepodong-II rocket splashed into the Pacific before broaching earth’s atmosphere or depositing a satellite into orbit, as was intended. In this sense, I don’t deny that the launch was technically deficient.

What I object to is the gleeful, patronizing spin that this “failure” is given in the media, allowing Americans to play it off as yet another bumbling, pathetic cry for attention by those crazy North Koreans and their crazy, ailing leader. This mindset has a dedicated following among an American public insecure about its dwindling world influence and power — it feels great to be able to puff ourselves up at North Korea’s expense, especially since nuclear capacity and military prowess are areas where we still excel relative to the rest of the world.

But beyond reinforcing an intellectually vacuous stereotype, this language comes too close to making light of — even downright ignoring — the North Korean threat. In the popular media, complex issues are often pared down and simplified to vapid sound bites. When talking North Korean missiles, this rhetoric ends up forming around two distinct poles of thought: what might be called the “ignorant peon” psychology, and the “paranoia” psychology.

The two ideas are best illustrated by a recent New York Times Online opinions feature titled “How hard is it to launch a rocket?”, in which two experts were asked to assess the North Korean launch. As John Pike, director of www.globalsecurity.com writes: “There is a tendency to disparage the North Koreans (as well as the Pakistanis, Iranians and Indians) as ignorant peons whose weapons skills are consistently derided as ‘primitive.’ While this latest test should fuel the ‘ignorant peon’ school, it should not.”

As Pike points out, while North Korea is only in the nascent phase of their long-range missile development, they have already successfully tested medium-range rockets under the tutelage of Iran and Pakistan. So, comprehensively dismissing the North Koreans as incompetent risks unclenching the ever-tightening fist with which the global community, Obama at the vanguard, hopes to wring out important concessions like full access for U.N. weapons inspectors, which would prevent Kim Jong-Il from augmenting and updating his arsenal.

To Pike, underestimating the North Koreans is a dangerous game. After all, “their small tramp cargo ships, with cargo containers housing reliable medium-range missiles, may already lurk off American coasts.”

Wait…what?

If Pike first gave us an excellent summation of the “ignorant peon” school of thought, this baffling, unfounded piece of scaremongering provides an equally excellent example of the “paranoia” psychology. This entails a very different worldview, in which the international black market, increasing dissemination of nuclear secrets, lax or unenforceable arms trafficking regulations and an easily-duped American intelligence community combine to create a ripe environment for opportunistic states like North Korea to advance illicit weapons projects.

Thus, though this is the third straight failed rocket launch for the Koreans, there is always the possibility that they will acquire the technology through a shady deal with the Iranians (actually a distinct possibility: see above), or divert their attentions to shadier projects (like missile-laden tramp cargo ships) that will fly under the intelligence community’s radar. Although I criticize the “ignorant peon” school because of its current prominence in the media, it was actually the paranoia psychology that led us after the chimera of WMDs in Iraq.

There are important aspects to take from both these positions. For example, as Rand Simberg, an ex-aerospace engineer, comments, North Korea really doesn’t possess the “industrial base” required to produce ballistic missiles; neither have they demonstrated the ability to produce a reliable nuclear warhead, much less one light enough or miniaturized enough to fit on the end of a rocket. It’s wrong to see them as “ignorant peons,” but it’s equally wrong to see them as rocket-scientist peons.

On the other hand, it’s certainly true that so-called “horizontal proliferation” has made it easier for the Koreans to get parts and plans from other nuclear states. A decade after buying nuclear secrets from the Pakistani A.Q. Khan, Iran is on the verge of attaining legitimate nuclear capabilities. There is a serious threat posed by the knowledge that North Korea also dealt with Khan, and so, with the knowledge in hand, it may just be a matter of time before they blossom into nuclear maturity.

So while we may all agree on “getting tough” with North Korea, it’s clear that there is difficulty in determining the immediacy and feasibility of the threat it poses. At the very least, we can guard ourselves against language implying either immunity or paranoia.

David is a first-year. You can reach him at dstern1@swarthmore.edu.