Opinions

Transitioning from an American world

In print | April 2, 2009

The Cold War, and more specifically the post-WWII economic boom that jetted the United States far ahead of the rest of the world, did strange things to the American psyche. The baby boomers and their immediate successors — the forty-, fifty- and sixty-somethings who lived through an era of unprecedented unilateral power — can be forgiven (maybe) for developing something of an ego. The fall of the Soviet Union and yet a further economic boom in the 1990s cemented vague notions of supremacy and arrogance firmly in place: American power and hegemony became the unchallenged status quo — a pleasant mantra of the past and present, and an implicit conviction for the future.

Two body blows suffered in the past six years have knocked the wind out of this collective illusion. First came the failed war in Iraq, rebuffing the idea that the United States could go it alone on pure military might. Still, a small hiccup in the Middle East could not totally shake the nation’s faith — there was still our overwhelming economic and cultural “soft” power to fall back on. That thought lasted until the beginning of the current financial crisis, which has many questioning the longevity or feasibility of our role as the economic leader, given the concomitant rise of competitive economic blocs in Asia and in Europe. Now, on the eve of the G-20 London Summit, which will host 20 of the world’s largest economies, it’s time for Americans to think seriously about what a post-American world order might look like.

For one, it will be diverse. Expanding economic blocs like China, India, Brazil, Russia and the E.U. ultimately want more of a share in the international economic system, and the increased leverage and autonomy that this entails. In the short term, this struggle is manifest in China and India’s claims for a greater voice in global financial institutions like the I.M.F., which is controlled primarily by the United States and Europe. When the head of China’s central bank called for supplanting the U.S. dollar — which functions as the world’s “default reserve currency” — with a synthetic form of money known as SDR’s, the suggestion wasn’t taken very seriously, but its sentiment was. The Chinese feel they have a right to participate in organizing the new international system, and they are not alone.

Unfortunately, the new players do not share the American leadership’s vision of what this international system might look like, or how best to accomplish it. London should offer them an excellent forum to voice their respective interests — Americans should take notice as the ideas, tensions and influences of the future world economy sound their nascent cries.

A particularly salient and contentious issue is how to most effectively boost the international economy out of recession. American economists, notably columnist Paul Krugman, are pushing hard for foreign countries to adopt their own versions of the recently passed U.S. stimulus package. The idea is that jump-starting our domestic economy is less effective if trading partners are still bogged down and can’t buy exported American goods, or are forced to raise prices on their own exports.

Many European nations counter that their extensive social safety nets have cushioned the blow of the recession, and are opting for less stimulus spending. A priority for the American G-20 representatives will be trying to convince Europe to pledge as much money as possible, both for their own European stimulus efforts, and for contributions to the I.M.F., which acts a supranational stimulus spender.

There are other divisive issues. For example, how should the new system address the problem of climate change? Since being exempted from the major provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, China and India’s emissions have risen by 150 and 103 percent (in the period 1992-2007). The European economic bloc, which has showcased the most initiative on this issue, will have a hell of a time convincing countries with such stupendous economic growth rates to slow down for the sake of posterity.

So, having more nations involved in developing an international system will surely lead to fresh conflicts. But from the American perspective, fear of a multi-polar economic world stems from the astute recognition that, if myriad nations are consuming a greater percentage of the international economic pie, someone (guess who?) will have to consume less.

The idea that the United States might not remain the dominant player in world affairs until the end of time really shouldn’t be so surprising. It also shouldn’t be that scary. Is a nation only great because of the magnitude of its G.D.P.? Are we patriots merely because our nation has the ability to push its agenda so forcefully throughout the world? The United States can still occupy a good seat at the table, and can still be its most illustrious guest. It’s just that, come dessert, we won’t be able to eat as much pie.

David is a first-year. You can reach him at dstern1@swarthmore.edu.