Justin Casey is a Visiting Instructor at Swarthmore College and a Ph.D Candidate in international relations at Georgetown University. Their dissertation, “The Propaganda Dilemma: Democracies in the War of Ideas,” draws on extensive research at the Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan Presidential Libraries, as well as The National Archives in London, to explore why democracies use propaganda in peacetime despite liberal norms against it. They also research how ideology shapes power politics, challenges to the liberal international order, and the transnational and transhistorical far-right. Their work has appeared in International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, and E-International Relations. Casey was previously a Predoctoral Research Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the George Washington University’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, a Hans J. Morgenthau Fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center, a Jill Hopper Memorial Fellow at Georgetown, and a Ph.D Ambassador for Georgetown’s Political Science – Predoctoral Summer Institute. They hold an M.A. in International Relations from Georgetown, and a B.S. in Political Science from Towson University.
Katie Kerman: To start, could you share a bit about your journey to Swarthmore College and how you developed your interest in international relations (IR) and great power competition (GPC)? What do you find most compelling about these fields, and why do you think studying IR is particularly important for college students, especially as they become engaged voters?
Professor Justin Casey: I was an undergraduate as Russo-American relations were falling apart. I went to a talk given by Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak after the annexation of Crimea in 2014–all I remember is that, during Q&A, an elderly gentleman heaped praise on Russia for standing up for traditional family values. Presumably, he was referencing Russia’s “gay propaganda” law passed the year prior. I didn’t think much of it at the time. I’ve always been obsessed with the Cold War, and started my Ph.D studies wanting to focus on modern US-Russia relations. One summer, I did research for my advisor, exploring Russia’s strategic ties to the global far right, and something clicked. The “traditional family values” line wasn’t just idle chatter, but a sign of something much bigger in world politics. Living through the global rise of far-right populism and seeing Russia’s role in encouraging it led me to study propaganda, subversion, and fascism in the interwar era. People working on GPC often discount ideology and the possible impact of the far right, but I took an interest in how ideology provides means and motives for states to compete. Working on this issue led me to apply for the Hans J. Morgenthau Fellowship at Notre Dame, where I learned way more about grand strategy and how to teach it. We even retraced the failed Athenian expedition into Sicily that Thucydides recorded, and I got to see a flock of wild flamingos on the land where their forces were bogged down. COVID closed archives and really slowed me down, but luckily Swarthmore was willing to hire me as I was finishing up my dissertation.
Why should IR matter to students? Politics are always important, and IR is the domain where this most clearly shows. The stakes are highest, the fate of millions hinges on the key decisions of a few, and the international system is an unforgiving landscape. This is truer now than it was when I was in undergrad in the early-2010s. Intensifying great power competition, climate change, far-right populism, and new technologies like AI pose a set of interconnected challenges for your generation (as a late millennial, I’m along for the ride too, lucky me!). Political science helps prepare us for these challenges. It gives us a sense of where the world is going, where it should go, and how to get us from point A to point B. It also helps give us a sense of scale: are our problems unprecedented (climate change anyone?), or have we been here before (modern battles over disinformation mirror earlier ones about radio broadcasting). My aim is to prepare you all to make informed choices and have productive conversations in the difficult times ahead so that you leave the world better off.
KK: In the context of today’s Western international political landscape, how might the next U.S. president influence the field of IR and shape the dynamics between the United States, China, and Russia?
JC: Currently, things are looking way up for China and Russia. Suspending military and economic aid to all countries (except Egypt and Israel) greatly reduces American influence abroad and increases Russia’s odds of success in Ukraine. It also risks alienating Taiwan at a time when China is growing more confident and capable. Cutting foreign aid, including the crucial PEPFAR program aimed at combating AIDS globally, will lead to death, a loss of influence, and worsening global health. Withdraw from the Paris Climate Accords and the World Health Organization will produce similar outcomes. There are some who welcomed the curtailment of American commitments abroad. Setting aside the question of whether Trump is a “restrainer” (in my opinion he isn’t), I argue that reducing commitments weakens America’s hand. Our competition with China is ultimately a fight over different visions of the international system. This is not a one-on-one boxing match, it’s a bar fight: you need friends, and you make friends by being cool and buying people drinks. With the U.S. out of the picture as a donor, China will fill the void and expand its global patronage networks. As the “only game in town,” China will be able to win allies easily and cheaply. And there are other opponents to keep track of. As far-right populism and disinformation spread, with encouragement from Russia, a lack of funding and diplomatic support will leave liberal democracies at greater risk. Deportations and funding freezes inflicted on the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation will make America less attractive for immigrants and scientists, and thus, less innovative and competitive.
The question of how all this influences “the field of IR” is an interesting one. A lot of IR folks on Bluesky are tracking these developments carefully. I think IR folks (and comparative politics scholars) are realizing that the far right is here to stay, and that far-right actors are transnationally supporting one another. They are also realizing just how fragile liberal democracy can be. Back in 2018 when I said I was studying fascism, I got some weird looks. Not anymore. There is a lot of great work coming out now as well on political polarization and how it makes democratic foreign policy suboptimal and unreliable. While a lot of scholars focus narrowly on economic and military statecraft, I believe that domestic unity, ideologies, international institutions, and legitimacy are important power political resources. We’ll see if I’m right about that.
KK: Lastly, looking ahead, where do you see this era of international politics leading us? Specifically, what are your thoughts on the prospects for future peace-building efforts between the United States, Russia, and China?
JC: To quote Raymond Aron, “peace impossible, war unlikely.” A direct conflict would be too cataclysmic and difficult to contain. Russia and China reject the liberal international order and will continue to hammer away at it. They might not have to try very hard since the order is being hollowed out as far-right populists gain traction everywhere. It’s in vogue right now to assume that we are heading toward a Sino-American Cold War, but I think the future will be more like the older imperial system with great powers carving up and defending spheres of influence that are closed off from each other. Great powers will court client states, wage proxy wars, subvert weaker states, and secure key resources as climate change squeezes them. Ok, so, a lot like the Cold War, but with more players.
Last year, I would have bet that the U.S. would stay on top. Now, I’m way less certain. Russia’s status as a serious contender depends on the outcome of the Ukraine War. China may lose momentum, or it might easily gain hegemony as it fills in the void left in the wake of American exit. The U.S. may be able to course-correct later, but it will be difficult to recover all the influence and power we are presently giving up. My biggest fears revolve around the ongoing, global erosion of liberal democracy, and the rise of eco-fascism further down the line. Every not-bad timeline requires the preservation of liberal democracy in the present.
