In print | Published September 18, 2008

While speaking at Bryn Mawr College last March, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright identified one country as the probable nexus of coming international instability: Pakistan. In the months since her speech, Ms. Albright’s prediction has come to seem more and more like the tragic reality of the region. Pakistan’s economy has collapsed and it remains a breeding ground for Islamist militants. Its neighbor and cohort in calamity, Afghanistan, has regressed from an optimistic post-war democratic bonanza circa 2002 into a sectarian free-for-all. It has come to seem increasingly likely that both countries will not escape from the Foreign Policy index of failed states.

Yet, in the face of impending disaster, the government of the United States has approached the issue from precisely the wrong angle. We have relied exclusively on brandishing the stick of American military might at a fragile regime, in the hopes of convincing it to hand over the Al Qaeda agents it is supposedly harboring.

This strategy is doomed to failure for several reasons.

First, destabilizing the already precarious presidency of Asif Zardari can only lead to more problems. Mr. Zardari is presently juggling a cornucopia of problems: a distrustful military, volatile public opinion and an impatient America, just to name a few. If one of these parties turns its back on Zardari’s administration, it stands little chance of recovering. As has been Pakistan’s habit, the collapse of a democratically elected regime results in the rise to power of a cataclysmic military autocracy. Years of Pervez Musharraf have taught the world that this is an unacceptable option.
Second, unilateral American action brings its own set of negative consequences, not only for Pakistan but also for the United States. While it is difficult to criticize the result of the Jul. 30 bombing of a compound close to the Afghan border in Pakistan, which led to the death of Midhat Mursi As-Sayid Umar, an Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert, it would be shortsighted to peg it as an all-out success.

For one, the United States claims to have already killed Abu Khabab, as Sayid Umar is known, once in January of 2006. But more problematically, unilateral action is leading to fear, rather than relief, on the part of Pakistanis. The Pakistani press flew off the handle in light of the American bombing, claiming that American incursions into Pakistan without Pakistani permission will contribute to more anti-American sentiment, the expansion of militant groups, and, as seems to be the case with every action one might take in the region, the collapse of Mr. Zardari’s government. Privately, a senior government official told The New York Times that continued American strikes would lead to “chaos.”
Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama, who has largely been given a free pass on the “warmongering” charge, is on precisely the wrong side of this issue. Speaking in Afghanistan in July, Mr. Obama remarked that if the United States possesses “actionable intelligence against high-value Al Qaeda targets, and the Pakistani government was unwilling to go after those targets,” the United States military should take action on its own. Senator Obama’s tough talk in regards to Pakistan, which has been echoed by the considerably more hawkish John McCain, has done little but frighten the already skittish Pakistani population.

The answer, instead, is to look to what the real causes of Pakistan’s ills are and how the United States might act to solve them. Without question, the problem at the top of the list is Pakistan’s economy. While Americans are loathe to hear about the financial woes of a far removed country in light of this week’s stock market washout, the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers is insignificant in comparison to last month’s 24 percent inflation rate in Pakistan. The financial reserves of the Pakistani government are slated to last another two months before petering out, taking with them the country’s supply of imported food and fuel. And however significant the slides in the American stock market might be, the Karachi Stock Exchange, which has lost approximately 40 percent of its value in the last three months, is doing worse.

While Americans are rightfully hesitant to throw money at international problems, there may be no better option in the case of Pakistan. Mr. Zardari’s lenders of choice, the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, have withheld much-needed bailouts until Zardari’s government proves itself to be reliable. But Pakistan, and in a broader sense, the region, may not have enough time to wait. Oil and food need to keep flowing into Pakistan and its government needs to remain solvent. The only way that is going to happen is with American aid.

For better or worse, the government of Asif Zardari is Pakistan’s best hope for a return to normalcy. And more significantly, he represents the world’s best hope for a successful fight against Al Qaeda. Instead of attacking suspected terrorists in Pakistan itself, stretching our already overextended military even further and raising the ire of Pakistani citizens, the United States needs to persuade Mr. Zardari’s government to step up to its obligation to regional security. The Pakistani military is the best equipped force to rout out terrorists within its own borders. The only question now is how to persuade it to do its job.

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