Rigger talks of interrelationship of Taiwan, US & China

In print | Published February 28, 2008

The Friends of Taiwan and the political science department hosted a lecture by Professor Shelley Rigger of Davidson College on Tuesday in which she spoke about the recent elections and their effects on future politics in Taiwan. The lecture, entitled “Taiwan’s 2008 Elections: Breaking New Ground?” concentrated on the 2008 legislative elections as well as the legacy of the current president, and their effects on Taiwan’s future. This was one of FoT’s first large-scale events since being chartered.

Aleta Hong ‘09, a member of FoT and an organizer of the event, considered it a success. “It was a great event,” Hong said. "Rigger really knows her stuff. She is articulate and engaging, especially if you don’t know everything about Taiwan already. It was very informative." Rigger is a Brown associate professor of East Asian politics at Davidson College and a leading expert on Taiwanese affairs, according to Tyrene White, professor of political science at Swarthmore. She is the author of two books, including “From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party,” as well as numerous publications. Phoenix staff writer Hannah Purkey recently sat down with Rigger to discuss the current political situation of Taiwan:

Hannah Purkey: Why are you interested in studying Taiwan?

Shelley Rigger: There are really two reasons. One was, when I was an undergraduate, I had a chance to do a research project in Taiwan the summer after my junior year. So I went over and just had a fantastic time. So I was always kind of interested, but I assumed when I went to graduate school I would work in the Mainland China field. I was just preparing to do dissertation research in China on minority politics, Islamic minorities in China, in June of 1989.

But the Tiananmen crisis in June of 1989 made a lot of Americans think, we’re just never going back there [China]; there was this strong emotional response that we can’t continue to do business as usual with China. The dissertation I wanted to do was politically risky even before a big political crackdown in China.

So I had to find another topic and someone suggested writing about Taiwan. Taiwan is an easy place to work, I already had some familiarity with the place, and I knew I could get the research done. Also at that time Taiwan was a really interesting case in the democrization field, so there was interest in political science as well as people interested in china in the Taiwan story. So that is how I ended up getting back in Taiwan again in the early ’90s.

HP: You spoke about the recent elections, but exactly how democratic is Taiwan?

SR: It is really democratic at this point. People sometimes complain about vote fraud and things like that but I think there is actually very little of that kind of thing. The main problems with Taiwan’s political system have to do with more how well the political system functions as opposed to whether or not it is democratic.

There is a lot of static between the legislative and executive branches in Taiwan because the constitution doesn’t make it clear enough whether it is a presidential system or a parliamentary system. You have problems like that, but those aren’t problems with democracy as much as they are problems with government. But in terms of things like freedom of speech, there is almost too much. But there is this one problem, which is that there is one issue, and it is a huge and important issue to everyone, that can’t be resolved in a democratic way. That is the question of what is Taiwan’s relationship to China. That I think is the interesting point.

If we take certain topics off the table, can you still be democratic? I think you can. We [the U.S.] have taken outlawing Islam off the table from our constitution, so I think that we always restrict ourselves in a democracy.

We say there are certain things we will not decide; we will not let the majority rule because they are too important. For Taiwan the independence question is one like that, but it is hard for many people to accept.

HP: What will be the long-term relationship between China and Taiwan?

SR: The best case scenario, which I think is also the likeliest scenario, is that things will stabilize as they are and will go on that way for a couple more decades until people in Taiwan and China decide that neither one needs to be somehow under the other, but that maybe they can be together under a third flag. So something like the British Commonwealth meets the European Union. I think that is a very realistic prospect.

What will prevent that from happening is if China loses patience, there is a crisis or collapse in China and the Chinese government needs to use Taiwan to prove its metal to the Chinese people. That is the most likely scenario for military conflict that would make this peaceful outcome not work.

TP: So there will be integration?

SR: There is already a lot of integration at the economic and cultural level, and we know from the EU that you can have separate political sovereignties and states that are very interconnected and think of themselves as meaningfully joined but are still also meaningfully separate. We do have models for that.

TP: What is the nature of this political resistance of moving closer to China?

SR: The Chinese government’s position is that Taiwan needs to become part of the People’s Republic of China under the communist party, and that is something very hard for the Taiwanese to understand, how they can continue to be democratic in the way that they are and also be under the PRC.

That is why this idea of a union of equals is so important. The Chinese government sometimes says that is what they want, but they don’t really mean it or they don’t say it often enough or firmly enough for people in Taiwan to believe it.

TP: How do you think the U.S.’s investment and dependence on China effects Taiwan and its future relations with China?

SR: The funny thing is you might think that it would be bad for Taiwan and for the U.S. to have so much investment in China, but nobody has more investment in China than Taiwan. The Taiwanese have already committed their economy to China, so I think it is actually good for Taiwan if the U.S. and China have good relations. That will help Taiwanese business in Taiwan and China to prosper, and it also creates some credible opportunities. Americans trust Taiwanese managers more than PRC managers, and many Taiwanese managers have better English skills as well as better international experience. U.S. investors in China also rely heavily on the Taiwanese; it is good for them, too.

TP: What has been the effect of the leak in the defense department about the U.S. selling weapons to Taiwan?

SR: I think the whole issue of arms sales and so on has become very complicated and politicized. The PRC has never wanted the U.S. to sell weapons to Taiwan; it has been a point of contention from the moment Nixon went to China, and it has never really been resolved. American policy makers have to manage that issue.

The U.S. is resolved to help Taiwan defend itself, but it is sometimes really complicated when the Taiwanese don’t seem resolved to help themselves.

I think it is one of those issues that is always with us, but I don’t think it has ever been fatal to any of these relationships.

All three sides have decided that there are other things that are more important, so they will fuss at each other over arms sales, but the basic pattern is pretty set.